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Effects of Learned Episodic Event Structure on Prospective
Duration Judgments
Myrthe Faber and Silvia P. Gennari
University of York
The field of psychology of time has typically distinguished between prospective timing and retrospective
duration estimation: in prospective timing, participants attend to and encode time, whereas in retrospec-
tive estimation, estimates are based on the memory of what happened. Prior research on prospective
timing has primarily focused on attentional mechanisms to explain timing behavior, but it remains
unclear the extent to which memory processes may also play a role. The present studies investigate this
issue, and specifically, the role of newly learned encoded event structure. Two structural properties of
dynamic event sequences were examined, which are known to modulate retrospective duration estimates:
the perceived number of segments and the similarity between them. We found that when duration and
episodic event content are both attended to and encoded, more segments and less similarity between them
led to longer attributed durations, despite clock duration remaining constant. In contrast, when only
duration is attended to, only the number of segments influenced estimated durations. These findings
indicate that incidentally or intentionally encoded episodic event structure modulates prospective dura-
tion judgments. Based on these and previous findings, implications for the role of memory mechanisms
on prospective paradigms are discussed.
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Although we do not always have access to a veridical measure
of time in terms of seconds or minutes, we are able to judge the
duration of an experience in various ways. The psychology of time
literature has traditionally distinguished between two main para-
digms to study duration judgments. In prospective paradigms,
participants are instructed to attend to time during stimulus pro-
cessing and thus have access to temporal information when judg-
ing stimulus duration. In contrast, in retrospective paradigms,
participants are not instructed to keep track of time and are
unaware of an upcoming temporal judgment, and can therefore
only reconstruct duration based on their memory of what happened
during a given interval. These paradigms have been argued to
involve different cognitive processes, whereby prospective timing
primarily depends on attentional mechanisms and retrospective
judgments depend on memory processes (Block & Gruber, 2014;
Block, Hancock, & Zakay, 2010; Block & Zakay, 1997; Brown,
2008; Grondin, 2010; Grondin, 2001; Zakay, Tsal, Moses, &
Shahar, 1994). Prospective judgments in particular have been
explained as a process of dynamic attending (Jones & Boltz, 1989)
or as a processes of pulse accumulation from an internal clock for
a subsequent—often comparative—judgment (Simon Grondin,
2005, 2010; Wearden & Lejeune, 2008). Although internal clock
models include a working memory component to allow for com-
parisons between intervals, much of the prospective research has
been devoted to understanding the effects of cognitive load and
related variables on timing. When attention is diverted to an
additional concurrent task other than timing, duration judgments
will vary as a function of the attention devoted to the timing task
(Block et al., 2010; Brown, 2008; Brown & Boltz, 2002; Zakay &
Block, 1996).
However, recent results have challenged the claim that memory
processes other than working memory play a minor or no role in
prospective judgments. Indeed, it has been shown that even when
we have access to (veridical) clock information, top-down knowl-
edge about duration plays a role in prospective timing. For exam-
ple, the number of consecutive pop songs played in the background
while participants performed a lexical-decision task modulated
prospective duration estimates: more remembered songs led to
longer estimates, both when people did and did not have access to
clock duration (Waldum & Sahakyan, 2013). Similarly, other
studies have shown that violations of prior expectations, which
require some form of stored knowledge in semantic memory to
make predictions, also modulate prospective judgments (Boltz,
2005). Interestingly, in contrast to the number-of-songs effect
above, some studies have shown that more segments in the stimuli
led to shorter judgments, rather than longer, albeit under different
task demands (Liverence & Scholl, 2012; Meyerhoff et al., 2015).
In any case, it appears that memory mechanisms—and in partic-
ular, the influence of prior knowledge on the episodic encoding of
an individual experience—play a role in prospective judgments,
although the nature of these mechanisms and their relation to task
demands remain unclear.
The goal of the present studies was to investigate the role of
encoded event structure in prospective duration judgments, and at
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the same time, shed some light on the effects of different task
demands. Unlike previous studies in which the typical duration of
songs or prior knowledge of familiar events provided relevant
information for the prospective time task, we investigated unfa-
miliar dynamic events containing geometric figures moving about
or interacting with each other and their environment. The distinc-
tion between familiar and unfamiliar stimuli is relevant because
stimulus encoding and recollection in these cases may differ con-
siderably and therefore, duration estimations may also differ (Bar-
tlett, 1995; Craik & Lockhart, 1972; Poppenk, Köhler, & Mosco-
vitch, 2010). Indeed, predictable familiar events are encoded and
recalled more easily, and duration estimates are shorter compared
with unpredictable, hard-to-encode stimuli (Boltz, 2005). Familiar
events also have associated typical durations in semantic memory
(Coll-Florit & Gennari, 2011), which may influence the duration
judgment of a specific event instantiation (Burt & Kemp, 1991). In
contrast, novel events for which we have no prior knowledge
strongly rely on bottom-up spontaneous structuring to build an
episodic representation of the experienced events (Zacks, 2004;
Zacks, Speer, Swallow, Braver, & Reynolds, 2007; Zacks & Tver-
sky, 2001). Such newly formed episodic event representations may
also modulate prospective judgments, although it is an open ques-
tion how they do so, particularly when the task—as those used
here—requires duration judgments after an entire stimulus set has
been processed (Boltz, 2005).
The present prospective studies therefore examined the role of
newly formed episodic representations of events, the encoding of
which is less reliant on familiarity or prior knowledge. In partic-
ular, the studies investigated two structural characteristics of
events that are known to modulate retrospective duration judg-
ments: the number of perceived segments or event units (whether
a dynamic stimulus is perceived as consisting of many or few
segments), and the similarity between these segments (Faber &
Gennari, 2015a, 2015b). In retrospective paradigms, the similarity
structure of the segments matters for event perception because it
affects their hierarchical organization into chunks or higher-level
segments containing similar lower-level segments, thus influenc-
ing the way in which information is encoded. Indeed, repetitive
segments can be encoded into one schematic event (Bellezza &
Young, 1989; Brady, Konkle, & Alvarez, 2009; Zacks et al.,
2007), whereas distinctive segments maintain their status as sep-
arate units. Following event structure approaches to memory and
perception (Zacks et al., 2007; Zacks, Tversky, & Iyer, 2001), it
has been argued that these event structure properties modulate
retrospective judgments because they are used to process the
stimulus events in the first place and thus they modulate how
events are stored and consequently retrieved during duration judg-
ments. The more information is stored and recalled, the longer the
duration attribution, as the reconstructed duration is based on the
recalled content (Faber & Gennari, 2015a, 2015b; Ornstein, 1969;
Poynter, 1983). Thus, retrospective duration judgments of an in-
terval tend to be longer when more segments, rather than fewer,
are recollected to have occurred in the interval. Likewise, similar
repetitive segments in an interval can be grouped or chunked into
high-level schematic representations during encoding, and thus
less information is encoded—and duration judgments tend to be
shorter—than when distinctive or individuated segments are sep-
arately encoded. In accordance with these encoding structuring
principles, Faber and Gennari (2015a, 2015b) found that retrospec-
tive duration judgments increased as the number of perceived
segments increased and the similarity between segments decreased
(i.e., events with numerous and dissimilar segments tend to be
judged as longer than those with fewer and more similar seg-
ments). Given that a retrospective paradigm has already shown
effects of memory encoding and retrieval on duration judgments,
can such memory modulations also be observed in prospective
judgments?
Following these previous studies, the present studies manipulated
the event structure of stimulus animations by altering the causal
structure of event sequences of the same clock duration. The stimulus
animations were arranged into conditions so that for the same clock
duration, the conditions varied in the number of perceived segments
and their similarity, as determined by independent viewers (see stim-
ulus pretests below). As in prospective paradigms, participants were
instructed to attend to the duration of the animations for a later
duration judgment task. In Experiment 1, participants were addition-
ally instructed to attend to event content (what happened in the
animations) for a subsequent memory test. In Experiment 2, partici-
pants were not instructed to study event content and only attended to
duration, thus content was encoded incidentally (if at all). To keep the
experimental protocol constant, both studies used a repeated-exposure
paradigm in which participants associated a stimulus animation with
a still frame that was later used as a retrieval cue for the animation.
We predicted that if episodic event structure resulting from sponta-
neous segmentation and perceived similarity during encoding modu-
lates prospective duration judgments, segmental and similarity struc-
ture should influence duration judgments to some extent, and
possibly, as much as they do in retrospective judgments. The studies
therefore were aimed at elucidating the role of encoded event structure
in prospective judgments, within the context of the present task
demands.
Experiment 1: Intentionally Encoded Event Structure
in Prospective Judgments
Experiment 1 examined the role of encoded event structure in
prospective duration judgments when participants were instructed
to attend to both stimulus duration and stimulus content for sub-
sequent memory and duration tasks. Event structure was manipu-
lated by creating animation triads of the same clock duration that
varied in the number of segments and their similarity. The triad
members—each representing one experimental condition—dis-
played the same main geometrical figure moving along a path, but
differed in the type of changes undergone by other figures within
the animation (e.g., color, shape, path or movement changes) (see
Figure 1 and examples in https://sites.google.com/a/york.ac.uk/
example-animations/). The number of segments perceived in the
animation and their similarity were determined in pretest studies
(below). According to these judgments, the basic condition within
the triads contained fewer event segments than the numerous
condition, whereas the dissimilar condition had as many segments
as the numerous condition, but less similar ones. Following pre-
vious findings showing modulations of encoded structure in ret-
rospective judgments, we expected that similar effects should be
found in the present prospective study, given that participants were
required to encode the animation content as well as attend to
duration. In particular, if the effect of encoded structure resembles
that found for retrospective judgments, we expected a positive
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trend across conditions so that as the number of segments in-
creased, and the degree of similarity decreased, longer duration
judgments should be observed (Faber & Gennari, 2015a).
Method
Participants. Sample size was based on our previous retro-
spective study that used the same stimuli and conditions (Faber &
Gennari, 2015a). This study yielded a medium effect size ("2 !
.07, observed power: .85) using a sample of 75 participants.
Therefore, in this study, we aimed for a similar sample size (25
participants for each of three lists, see below), after excluding
participants with poor memory accuracy. A total of 82 native
English-speaking students from the University of York (74% fe-
male, mean age ! 21.2, with normal or corrected-to-normal vi-
sion) participated for course credit, course requirement or a small
monetary reward. Seven participants with poor memory accuracy
were excluded as they had low accuracy scores in the recognition
task, according to a criterion previously used in the retrospective
studies (recognition accuracy !50% in one of the conditions or a
false alarm rate above 50%; Faber & Gennari, 2015a). These
exclusions were motivated by our goal of examining performance
in duration judgments when participants have performed reason-
ably well in a memory task. If they had no recollection of the
animations’ content, it is impossible to draw conclusions about the
role of encoded event structure. This experiment was approved by
the Ethics Committee of the Department of Psychology of the
University of York. Participants provided informed consent and
were debriefed after the study.
Stimuli. The stimuli were taken from Faber and Gennari
(2015a) and consisted of 28 animation triads that were created with
Adobe Flash CS5.5, each lasting an integer number of seconds
(varying between 3 and 9 seconds, 4 animation triads for each of
the 7 time bins). Triad members were equal in clock duration, and
were arranged into three conditions: a basic event sequence con-
taining a repeating or stable motion of a shape (basic condition), a
sequence with a repeating change (e.g., displacement) added onto
the basic motion (numerous condition), and a sequence like the
numerous one, but with dissimilar changes (e.g., displacement and
disappearance; dissimilar condition; see Figure 1 and examples in
https://sites.google.com/a/york.ac.uk/example-animations/). The
basic condition in a triad was systematically modified into the
numerous condition, which in turn was modified into the dissimilar
condition, keeping speed of motion constant. Across triads, shapes,
motion, and changes were visually different to prevent memory
interference. The stimuli also included a single still frame from
near the beginning of the triad animations that was common to all
triad members. These cue frames were used as a retrieval cue in the
memory and duration judgment task. Two additional anchor ani-
mations (lasting 2 and 10 seconds respectively) and their corre-
sponding cue frames were also created to facilitate the duration
judgment task, providing the boundaries of a duration scale from
the shortest to the longest studied animation (see Design and
procedure).
Stimulus pretests. To ascertain that the created animations
differed in their stimulus properties across conditions, separate sets
of participants provided judgments on the perceived number of
segments and the relative similarity between subevents in an
animation. Two Web-based questionnaires were conducted. Stim-
uli were organized in three lists as in the main study (see Design
and procedure). A total of 121 English speakers recruited through
Amazon Mechanical Turk completed the questionnaires (4 partic-
ipants were excluded from the segmentation data due to their
idiosyncratic scores). A total of 87 participants were used in the
segmentation task (29 per list, mean age ! 34.6, 52% males) and
a total of 30 participants were used in the similarity task (10 per
list, mean age ! 38.7, 46% males). The web-link provided to
Figure 1. Examples of stimulus triads and cue frames in Experiment 1 and 2. See the online article for the color
version of this figure.
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participants directed them to a custom-built web page containing a
list of stimulus animations.
In the subevent questionnaire, participants indicated the number
of instances in which a smallest natural and meaningful unit within
the animation finished and another started. These instructions were
based on those used in event segmentation studies (Zacks et al.,
2001). Participants were told to watch the animation several times
and count these instances. As shown in Table 1, larger numbers of
subevents were perceived in the numerous and dissimilar condi-
tions compared with the basic condition. Repeated measures
ANOVA with triads as a random factor and mean number of
subevents as dependent variable indicated a main effect of condi-
tion (F(2, 54) ! 5.53, p ! .007; "2 ! .17) with all pairwise
comparisons being significant (all ps # .05) except for that be-
tween the numerous and the dissimilar conditions, as expected.
Note, however, that the difference in number of segments is
relatively small compared with other segmentation studies, in part
because large differences between animations of different clock
duration (say, 3 vs. 9 seconds) are averaged out in Table 1, as
indicated by the large ranges. This motivates the by-item hierar-
chical regression approach (see Analyses), which better accounts
for differences in the number of segments in a given animation.
The similarity questionnaire asked participants to judge how
similar the events within each animation were to one another on a
scale of 1–7 (1 ! not similar at all, 7 ! very similar). Examples
were provided illustrating the extreme points of the scale. The
animations could be watched as many times as desired by clicking
a play button. The order of the animations in the web page was
random. Table 1 shows the similarity ratings for each condition.
Animations in the numerous condition were judged to contain
similar subevents to a comparable extent as the subevents of the
basic condition. In contrast, animations in the dissimilar condition
were judged to contain less similar subevents. Repeated measures
ANOVA with triads as a random factor and similarity rating as
dependent variable indicated that there was a main effect of
condition, F(2, 54) ! 27.05, p # .001; "2 ! .50, and all pairwise
comparisons were highly significant (all ps # .01) except for that
between the basic and the numerous conditions, as expected.
Design and procedure. Items were arranged in three lists of
28 animations. Each list contained only one member of each triad
(either basic, numerous or dissimilar) but all conditions across
triads. The allocation of triad members to lists was as follows. The
triads were numbered from 1 to 28 and organized according to
duration, with the first four triads lasting 3 sec, the next four triads
lasting 4 sec, and so on. For the first triad, the basic, numerous, and
dissimilar conditions were assigned to lists 1, 2, and 3, respec-
tively; for the second triad, these conditions were assigned to lists
2, 3, and 1, respectively; for the third triad, they were assigned to
lists 3, 2, and 1, respectively and so on. This meant that each list
contained either 9 or 10 members of each condition spanning the
whole range of clock durations (from 3 to 9 sec). This arrangement
was the same as in previous retrospective studies. Participants
were then randomly assigned to one of the three lists.
Participants were recruited to take part in an experiment on time
and memory, and were instructed to study the content of the
animations (i.e., what happens in the animation) and to remember
their relative duration, together with their paired frames, which
were to be used in a subsequent memory test to probe their
memory for the animation content and duration. They were in-
structed to attend to the relative duration of animations rather than
their real-time duration, and were instructed not to tap or count in
their head as a way of timekeeping while studying the animations.
In the study task, a list of 28 animations plus the two anchor
animations (30 animations in total) was presented. Each participant
saw their list three times in different random orders. For each trial,
the cue frame was displayed for 2 seconds followed by the asso-
ciated animation. When the animation finished, a new display
prompted for a key press to progress to the next trial. The study
phase lasted approximately 15 min.
After the study phase, participants performed the recognition
memory task. The 30 cue-frames that a participant had studied plus
30 foil frames (similar frames to those studied but previously
unseen) were presented in random order. The foil frames were
extracted from a triad member not studied in the list (e.g., if the
basic condition was studied for a triad, the foil frame was a middle
or late frame from the numerous or dissimilar conditions of that
triad), thus keeping foils and cue frames fairly similar and requir-
ing detailed knowledge of the animations. Participants indicated
whether each frame belonged to one of the studied animations by
pressing a YES or NO key. The number of cue frames and foil
frames was equal. A fixation cross was presented on the screen for
1–3 seconds to randomly vary intertrial time between participants’
responses. The recognition memory task lasted approximately 5–6
min.
Finally, in the duration judgment task, participants were shown
the studied cue frames in random order and were asked to indicate
the relative duration of its associated animation on a 1–7 scale
(1 ! very short, 7 ! very long). Instructions indicated (by dis-
playing the anchor animations’ cue frames) that the anchor ani-
mations were the shortest and longest in the studied set and were
outside the scale. The objective was to indicate that the whole 1–7
scale should be used in providing the judgments. Randomly varied
intertrial times were used as in the recognition task. In each trial,
participants saw the cue frame in the center of the screen, with the
1–7 scale displayed at the bottom. Extreme of the scale were
indicated by 1 - very short, and 7 - very long. This screen was
Table 1
Stimulus Properties
Conditions
Number of segments Segmental similarity
Mean SD Range Mean SD Range
Basic 4.49 1.79 1.79–8.76 5.06 1.26 2–7
Numerous 4.73 1.87 2.14–9.07 5.07 .94 3–6
Dissimilar 4.85 1.85 2.28–9.31 3.89 1.14 2–6
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displayed until a participant pressed a number between 1 and 7. A
central cross was displayed during the variable intertrial time. Note
that alternative tasks used in timing studies were deemed less
appropriate for use here because clock estimates (e.g., seconds)
encourage counting during stimulus processing, even when partic-
ipants are told not to do so. Here participants were explicitly told
that they would later have to compare duration within the stimulus
set and clock-type values would not be requested, and thus, there
was no need to count seconds. Moreover, if participants were to
count and occupy their processing resources in such a task, there
may be interference between counting and encoding content into
episodic memory, an issue that we wanted to avoid. We will come
back to various possible effects of task demands in the general
discussion.
Data treatment.
Recognition memory task. From this task, we only analyzed
response latencies to the probes (not foils). Outlier recognition
latencies longer than 2.5 standard deviations from each condition
mean were excluded from these data (63 of 2100 response laten-
cies, 3% of the data). We excluded one additional response be-
cause it was deemed unreliable (#100 ms). For the analysis across
conditions, only correct responses were taken into account (i.e.,
yes-responses to probes).
Duration judgment task. We excluded responses longer than
10 seconds (20 out of 2100 responses, 0.9% of the data), as these
were not deemed to represent confident judgments. From these
data, 35 responses (1.7%) were also excluded if a participant failed
to both correctly recognize and reject the frames associated with an
item animation (i.e., an item’s cue frame and foil frame were
incorrectly rejected and accepted, respectively), as this suggested
that there was no appropriate memory trace for that animation.
Analyses. To statistically examine the effect of event struc-
ture, we performed two sets of analyses. First, we investigated
whether duration ratings across subjects (F1) and triads (F2) dis-
play the same increasing pattern across stimulus conditions (i.e.,
manipulations of internal event structure) that we found previously
for retrospective estimates. In particular, after the main analysis of
variance across conditions, we specifically tested that positive
trends across conditions indeed explained most of the variance in
the data, as predicted. For this, we conducted planned contrasts for
positive trends, which assign the weights $1, 0, and %1 to the
basic, numerous, and dissimilar conditions, respectively, and then
checked that the residual variance of this trend was not significant
(Hays, 1981). Analyses performed on raw mean estimates, as well
as on mean ratios (estimated duration divided by actual duration)
yielded a similar pattern of results (Boltz, 1995). For this latter
analysis, the numbers on the 1–7 scale were transformed into clock
times as indicated by the duration of the anchor animations (e.g.,
1 representing 3 seconds, up to 7 representing 9 seconds) and then
divided by the actual duration of the animation.
Second, we used hierarchical multiple regression analyses to
assess the independent contribution of clock duration and event
properties on an animation-by-animation basis, which captured the
effect of the items’ individual event properties more precisely than
grouping conditions. These analyses allowed examining the pro-
portion of variance accounted for at each step of the model over
and above other predictors by computing R2 change statistics. For
instance, if similarity between subevents explains variance inde-
pendent of segmentation, it should significantly increase the vari-
ance accounted for by the previously entered predictors, such as
the number of segments and clock duration.
Results
Recognition memory task. The overall recognition memory
accuracy was 87% (SD ! 8.8%) after participant exclusions,
taking correct identification into account (see Table 2). There was
no difference in hits between conditions (Friedman’s test &2(2) !
.032, ns). Note that accuracy of correct recognition in this task was
no different from that in our previous retrospective study (Mann–
Whitney test, U ! 2589, ns), suggesting that the instruction to
attend to duration did not preclude participants from encoding the
content of the animations as well as in a retrospective paradigm.
The recognition time data replicated previous findings, with
recognition times increasing as a function of condition (see Table
2). The results of repeated measures ANOVAs with either subjects
(F1) or triads (F2) as a random factor and recognition times as a
dependent variable indicated that there was a significant main
effect of condition on the response latencies, F1(1.78, 132!) !
3.40, p ! .041, "2 ! .044 !Greenhouse-Geisser corrected for
sphericity; F2(2, 54) ! 3.49, p ! .037, "2 ! .115, and significant
positive trends, F1(1, 74)! 4.80, p! .032, "2! .061, F2(1, 27)!
8.33, p ! .008, "2 ! .236. These differences reflect the role of
qualitative aspects of the animations (Yonelinas, 2001), suggesting
that properties of the events encoded in memory during the study
phase were accessed or checked during memory judgments, with
the conditions that required access to more segments and less
similarity between them leading to increased response latencies.
Because the implications of these recognition findings have been
discussed in detail elsewhere, we do not discuss them further here
(Faber & Gennari, 2015a).
Duration judgment task. We expected that if encoded event
structure modulated prospective duration judgments, the pattern of
results should resemble that found in the parallel retrospective
study previously reported: duration ratings should vary across
conditions following a positive trend, despite clock duration re-
maining constant. Mean ratios across conditions differed signifi-
cantly, F1(2, 148) ! 7.82, p ! .001, "2 ! .10; F2(2, 54) ! 4.26,
p # .02, "2 ! .141 (see Table 3). The dissimilar condition was
judged longer than the other conditions, and the numerous condi-
tion was judged longer than the basic condition. As predicted, the
duration ratios displayed a positive trend, F1(1, 74) ! 11.96, p !
.001, "2 ! .14; F2(1, 27) ! 6.67, p ! .02, "2 ! .20, with no
significant residual variance in the data, F1(1, 74)! 1.38, p! .76;
F2(1, 27) ! .33, p ! .43. Analyses using the raw duration ratings
yielded a similar main effect of condition, F1(2, 148)! 3.994, p!
.02, "2 ! .051 across subjects; F2(2, 52) ! 3.673, p ! .03, "2 !
.12, controlling for differences across clock durations by adding
clock duration to the model as a covariate, and displayed a similar
positive trend, F1(1, 74) ! 7.26, p ! .009, "2 ! .089; F2(1, 26) !
7.31, p ! .01, "2 ! .22. These findings suggest that in the present
prospective paradigm, longer durations were attributed to events of
the same clock duration as a function of event structure.
1 Note that a similar ANOVA conducted with experimental list as a
factor revealed no main effect of list or interaction with condition (list
effect: F1(2,72) ! 1.22, p ! .30), interaction: F1(4,144) ! .26, p ! .90).
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Regression analyses. To evaluate the effect of segmental and
similarity characteristics of the animations on duration judgments,
we conducted by-item hierarchical multiple regressions and exam-
ined the proportion of variance accounted for by segment and
similarity scores (obtained from the independent pretest studies).
Note that there was no significant correlation between the number
of segments and similarity scores, r ! $.09, p ! .40. In the first
step of the regression model, we included clock duration as a
control predictor to account for the systematic variation built
across triads. This regression model thus contained mean ratings
per item as a dependent variable and clock duration as predictor. In
the second step, we added subevent scores to the first regression
model. This yielded a significant increase in the proportion of
variance accounted for: R2 increased from .39 to .50, Fchange(1,
81) ! 16.86, p # .001. In the third step, we added the similarity
ratings to this regression model, which also yielded a significant
increase in the proportion of variance accounted for: R2 increased
from .50 to .53, Fchange(1, 80) ! 4.75, p ! .03. This pattern of
significance remained the same regardless of the order in which
the predictors were added to the model. Table 3 reports the
statistics of the full regression model. Thus, although as expected,
clock duration was able to explain a significant proportion of
variance in the duration ratings, both the number of perceived
subevents and similarity between them significantly improved the
fit, suggesting that participants attributed duration based on both
attended time and the event structure encoded in memory: increas-
ing the number of subevents in a sequence led to increased dura-
tion attributions, and so did decreasing the similarity between them
(hence, the negative relationship in Table 4).
Decision times. For completeness, we also examined the time
it took participants to provide a duration rating across conditions,
although we did not predict an effect of condition in this measure
because the parallel retrospective study in Faber and Gennari
(2015a) did not yield any differences in decision times. Note also
that our decision times reflect decision-making processes leading
to a rating—in particular, comparisons across previously encoded
events relative to a scale—and little is known about how event
segmental structure may modulate such decisions. Unlike duration
reproduction and perceptual judgments immediately after a stim-
ulus is perceived, rating decisions in this experiment must rely on
previously encoded memory cues, and might involve currently
unexplored processes, such as competition between alternative
memory cues or potential ratings, or even heuristic strategies
(Oppenheimer & Kelso, 2015; Shah & Oppenheimer, 2008).
The decision times for the ratings reported above were used in
the analysis. Results indicated that there was no main effect of
condition in decision times (mean decision times: basic condi-
tion ! 3051 ms, numerous condition ! 3004 ms, dissimilar
condition ! 3054 ms; F1(1.84, 136!) ! .237, p ! .771; F2(1.65,
44.6!) ! .277, p ! .717 !Greenhouse-Geisser corrected for spheric-
ity). Furthermore, there was no significant relationship between the
decision times and duration ratings on a by-animation level (r! .012,
p! .91; rpartial!$.021, p! .85, controlling for clock duration). The
absence of a condition effect was further corroborated by exploratory
by-animation regression analyses similar to those above, which re-
vealed no relationship between mean decision times and actual clock
duration or number of segments, suggesting that decision times are
not modulated by those variables that more strongly predicted attrib-
uted duration. We did however observe a significant negative rela-
tionship between similarity and decision times (' ! $.242, p !
.029). which might be attributable to alternative ratings or memory
cues being considered in making decisions for animations with less
similar segments. These results indicate that attributed durations (rat-
ings) and decision times were driven by different animation properties
and reflect different aspects of processing. Most notably, decisions
times were unrelated to actual clock duration, a typical property of
duration judgments. Therefore, we focus our discussion on the dura-
tion rating ultimately attributed to an animation, rather than decision
times, which appear to reflect decision processes.
Discussion
The results of Experiment 1 demonstrated that prospective du-
ration judgments—but not necessarily decision times—were mod-
ulated by event properties when participants were required to
Table 2
Recognition Performance and Recognition Times for
Experiment 1
Measure
Condition
Basic Numerous Dissimilar
Percentage of correct
recognition 88% 88% 87%
Recognition times
(ms) 1291 (45) 1367 (54) 1400 (57)
Note. Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 3
Duration Ratings Across Items for Experiment 1
Measure
Condition
Basic Numerous Dissimilar
Duration ratings
(1–7 score) 4.03 (.18) 4.17 (.16) 4.24 (.16)
Duration rating
ratios 1.10 (.06) 1.13 (.07) 1.15 (.07)
Note. Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 4
Multiple Regression Model for the Duration Ratings of
Experiment 1
Model B SE B '
Model 1
Constant 2.54 .23
Clock duration .27 .04 .63!!!
Model 2
Constant 2.32 .22
Clock duration .15 .05 .34!!
Number of sub-events .21 .05 .43!!!
Model 3
Constant 2.93 .35
Clock duration .14 .04 .32!!
Number of sub-events .20 .05 .43!!!
Similarity $.12 .05 $.17!
! p # .05. !! p # .01. !!! p # .001.
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remember both relative duration and event content. Both the num-
ber of perceived segments and the similarity between them ex-
plained significant proportions of variance in the duration ratings,
over and above clock duration and over and above each other. An
increase in the number of segments and a decrease in similarity
were related to an increase in duration rating, as expected. More-
over, the pattern of performance in the memory recognition task
was not different from that in a retrospective paradigm, suggesting
that content was encoded equally well in both paradigms regard-
less of additional attention to time in the present experiment.
Importantly, the present recognition and judgment results clearly
parallel those previously reported using a retrospective paradigm
(Faber & Gennari, 2015a), and suggest that remembering episodic
event structure affects prospective duration judgments if partici-
pants are instructed to encode content. Therefore, prospective
judgments can be modulated by specific aspects of episodic mem-
ory content, suggesting a role for encoding and retrieval memory
mechanisms, at least in some circumstances.
It is interesting to note that attending to time did not appear to
have interfered with encoding content, which contrasts with pre-
vious suggestions by some attention models (Brown, 2008). At-
tending to time did not preclude from encoding event content
likely because the two tasks were not in conflict, and attention did
not need to be alternatively allocated to one or another task goal.
In fact, as suggested by some timing models, it is possible that
attending to content, for example, the number of segments per-
ceived, helps timing, and can be used as cues to later recollect and
evaluate duration (Jones & Boltz, 1989). This is very similar to
what has been proposed for retrospective paradigms (Block, 1982;
Ornstein, 1969; Poynter, 1989) and suggests that recollection
mechanisms appear to play a role in prospective paradigms too, at
least when stimulus content is attended to.
Experiment 2: Incidentally Encoded Event Structure
in Prospective Judgments
Experiment 1 indicated that the episodic event structure encoded
during stimulus processing played a role in prospective time judg-
ments when attention to stimulus content is also required by the
task instructions. However, it remains unclear whether episodic
structure would still play a role when attention to content is not
required for a subsequent memory task. Therefore, to establish
whether episodic event structure also plays a role when no atten-
tion to content is required, we conducted an experiment exactly as
Experiment 1, but only instructed participants to attend to duration.
Importantly, exposure to the stimuli was the same as in Experiment
1, thus making incidental encoding possible. As before, if episodic
memory encoding and retrieval plays any role in prospective
duration judgments, we would expect modulations of event struc-
ture on duration judgments, and specifically, of the number of
segments and their similarity.
Method
Participants. Participants were 79 native English-speaking
students from the University of York (70% female, mean age !
21.0) who participated for course credit, course requirement, or a
small monetary reward. Four participants with poor memory ac-
curacy were excluded as they had low accuracy scores in the
recognition task (overall recognition accuracy !50% or a false
alarm rate above 50%), resulting in 75 participants in total (25 per
list). As study of the animations’ content was not required, we
expected recognition to be lower than in Experiment 1. The ex-
clusion criteria used here were therefore slightly more lenient than
in Experiment 1 (overall recognition accuracy !50% instead
of !50% in one or more conditions). Participants had normal or
corrected-to-normal vision. This experiment was approved by the
Ethics Committee of the Department of Psychology of the Uni-
versity of York. Participants provided informed consent and were
debriefed after the study.
Stimuli. The same animations were used here as in Experi-
ment 1.
Design and procedure. The design of this study was like that
of Experiment 1, except that participants were instructed to pay
careful attention only to the relative duration of the animations. As
before, they were instructed not to tap or count in their head as a
way of time keeping while watching the animations, as judgments
in seconds would not be required. Importantly, participants re-
ceived no instruction to remember the content of the animations. It
was pointed out to them that each animation would be preceded by
a still frame that would later be used to refer back to the animation.
After the study phase, participants performed a recognition mem-
ory task, which to these participants came as a surprise. Finally,
they performed a duration rating task identical to that of Experi-
ment 1.
Data treatment.
Recognition memory task. For analyses of the recognition
memory task, as in Experiment 1, outlier recognition latencies
longer than 2.5 standard deviations from the condition mean were
excluded from these data (47 out of 2100 response latencies, 2.1%
of the data).
Duration judgment task. As in Experiment 1, items for which
it took a participant longer than 10 seconds to respond (59 out of
2100, 2.8% of the data) were excluded from the duration judg-
ments. To keep exclusions comparable across experiments, 53
responses (2.5%) were also excluded if a participant failed to both
correctly recognize and reject the frames associated with an item
animation (i.e., an item’s cue frame and foil frame were incorrectly
rejected and accepted, respectively). However, given that memory
accuracy was lower than Experiment 1 (see below) we also con-
ducted all analyses without this memory exclusion, yielding sim-
ilar results.
Results
Recognition memory task. The overall recognition memory
accuracy was 83% (SD ! 15%) taking correct identification into
account. There was no difference in correct identification between
conditions (Friedman’s test, &2(2) ! 2.86, ns; see Table 5). How-
ever, correct identification was significantly lower in Experiment
2 compared with Experiment 1 (Mann–Whitney test, U! 2091.50,
p ! .007), suggesting that event structure was less deeply encoded
here compared with carefully studying the animations for a sub-
sequent memory test as in Experiment 1. This was expected given
the varying task instructions and the unexpected nature of the
recognition task for the present participants.
A similar suggestion was evidenced by the pattern of recogni-
tion times, which did not vary across conditions. The results of
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repeated measures ANOVAs with either subjects (F1) or triads
(F2) as a random factor and recognition times as a dependent
variable indicated that there was no significant main effect of
condition on the response latencies, F1(2, 148) ! .471, p ! .63,
"2 ! .006; F2(2, 54) ! .26, p ! .78, "2 ! .009, no significant
positive trends, F1(1, 74) ! .007, p ! .94, "2 ! .000, F2(1, 27) !
.061, p ! .81, "2 ! .002, and no significant contrast across
conditions (all p’s ( .05). Taken together, these results suggest
that participants’ memory of the content of the animation was
poorer compared with Experiment 1, as expected.
Duration judgment task. We expected that if the number of
subevents and their dissimilarity modulate the attributed duration
of events, the duration ratings should vary across conditions,
despite clock duration remaining constant. Table 6 displays the
mean ratios across conditions, which did not differ significantly,
F1(1.66, 122.4!) ! 1.37, p ! .26, "2 ! .02 !Greenhouse-Geisser
corrected for sphericity; F2(2, 54) ! .35, p ! .71, "2 ! .01. There
were no significant positive trends, F1(1, 74) ! 2.59, p ! .11,
"2 ! .03; F2(1, 27) ! .57, p ! .46, "2 ! .02, and no significant
contrasts between conditions. This pattern of results remained the
same if the raw rating scores are used as dependent variable, with
no significant main effects of condition, F1(2, 148) ! .508, p !
.60, "2 ! .007 across subjects; F2(1, 52) ! .030, p ! .97, "2 !
.001, across triads controlling for differences across clock dura-
tions by adding clock duration to the model as a covariate, and no
significant positive trends, F1(1, 74) ! 1.01, p ! .319, "2 ! .013;
F2(1, 26) ! .004, p ! .95, "2 ! .000.
Note that the exclusion criteria based on memory perfor-
mance used here were more lenient than those used in Exper-
iment 1. We also performed the above analyses using the same
memory exclusion criteria as Experiment 1. This resulted in the
exclusion of 11 participants based on memory performance, and
another five (with the next lowest memory scores for their
respective lists) to counterbalance the number of participants
per list (total sample size of 63, resulting in 21 participants per
list). Given the effect size of Experiment 1 ("2 ! .10, observed
power ! .95), a sample size of 41 subjects should be sufficient
to detect an effect of condition in a prospective paradigm (Faul,
Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). No significant differences
were found between the mean rating ratios across conditions,
F1(1.72, 106.4)! ! 1.36, p ! .26, "2 ! .02 !Greenhouse-
Geisser corrected for sphericity; F2(2, 54) ! .29, p ! .75, "2 !
.01. There were no significant positive trends, F1(1, 62) ! 2.35,
p ! .13, "2 ! .04; F2(1, 27) ! .26, p ! .62, "2 ! .009, and no
significant contrasts between conditions. The same holds true
for analyses of the raw duration ratings, displaying no main
effect of condition, F1(2, 124) ! .612, p ! .54, "2 ! .01 across
subjects; F2(2, 52) ! .439, p ! .65, "2 ! .017 across triads
controlling for differences across clock durations by adding
clock duration to the model as a covariate, and no significant
positive trends or contrasts (all p " .32). Although we acknowl-
edge that the true effect size could be smaller, the present
findings suggest that there was no significant effect of condition
on duration ratings.
Regression analyses. Because regressions on an item-by-item
basis can be more sensitive to establish correspondences across
continuous variables than a categorical ANOVA, particularly con-
sidering that the animations varied in duration, number of seg-
ments and similarity within a given grouping category, we con-
ducted the same hierarchical multiple regression analyses
performed in Experiment 1 to test whether event structure modu-
lated duration ratings. In the first step, clock duration was added to
the model as a control predictor. The number of segments was then
added to this model, yielding a significant increase in the propor-
tion of variance accounted for: R2 increased from .27 to .37,
Fchange(1, 81) ! 12.75, p ! .001. The similarity ratings were then
added to this model, but did not significantly increase the propor-
tion of variance explained (R2 remains .37). Table 7 reports the
statistics of the full regression model. Results did not change when
adding the variables in any different order, or when entering data
with the stricter participant exclusions as a dependent variable.
Thus, the number of subevents but not their relative similarity was
related to an increase in attributed duration when participants were
not required to encode content.
Decision times. For completeness, we examined the time it
took participants to provide a duration judgment across conditions,
as done for Experiment 1. Although we did not have specific
predictions for decision times based on previous findings, it might
be informative to compare the results across the two experiments,
which only differed in task instructions. Similar to the decision
times of Experiment 1, results indicated that there was no signif-
icant main effect of condition, F1(2, 148) ! 1.59, p ! .21; F2(2,
54) ! 2.15, p ! .13. The dissimilar condition showed numerically
longer decision times (mean basic condition! 3088 ms, numerous
condition ! 3097 ms, dissimilar condition ! 3220 ms). Further
by-item regression analyses similar to those above revealed that
decisions times were not predicted by clock duration and segmen-
tal structure—which did explain duration ratings—but did show a
negative relationship with similarity (' ! $2.02, p ! .047). As in
Experiment 1, decision times were not related to clock duration
and number of segments as attributed duration was, suggesting that
decisions times were orthogonal to attributed duration.
Finally, the decision times in Experiment 2 were not substan-
tially different from those of Experiment 1. A mixed ANOVA with
Table 5
Recognition Memory Results for Experiment 2
Measure
Condition
Basic Numerous Dissimilar
Percentage of correct
recognition 81% 85% 83%
Recognition times
(ms) 1386 (66) 1426 (65) 1382 (61)
Note. Standard error in parentheses.
Table 6
Duration Ratings Across Items for Experiment 2
Measure
Condition
Basic Numerous Dissimilar
Duration ratings
(1–7 score) 4.16 (.16) 4.22 (.15) 4.26 (.17)
Duration rating
ratios 1.14 (.07) 1.14 (.07) 1.15 (.07)
Note. Standard errors in parentheses.
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mean decision times as dependent variable, condition as repeated
factor and experiment as between-participants factor indicated no
main effect of condition, F1(1.81, 296!) ! 1.22, p ! .30;
F2(1.75,108!) ! 1.85; p ! .16 !both Tests Greenhouse-Geisser
corrected for sphericity, no main effect of experiment, F1(1,
148) ! .37, p ! .54; F2(1, 54) ! .58, p ! .44, and no interaction.
Direct comparisons between experiments for each condition sep-
arately indicated no significant difference across experiments (all
ps ( .05). This suggests that task instructions did not significantly
alter the overall length or difficulty of the decision process across
experiments.
Discussion
The results of Experiment 2 suggest that there was no effect of
grouping condition on duration ratings when participants have
explicitly attended to relative duration but not to stimulus content.
Less attention to the specific animation content was evidenced in
relatively poor performance in recognition memory, compared
with Experiment 1, and the absence of a condition effect in
recognition times—an effect replicated several times when content
is attended to (Faber & Gennari, 2015a, 2015b). Because our
grouping conditions were based on the number of fine-grained—
perceived as the smallest—segments and their similarity, which
require attention to specific details of the animations (e.g., color or
shape changes), the absence of a condition effect on duration
ratings is not surprising, as these specific aspects may have not
been attended to, encoded, or recollected. However, the regression
results indicated that across items, the number of segments (but not
the similarity between them) was a good predictor of attributed
duration, with higher numbers of segments being related to longer
duration ratings, over and above clock duration. Together, these
findings suggest that the effect of episodic event structure on
duration ratings was reduced but present when content is not
explicitly encoded.
Importantly, the observed positive effect of the number of segments
on the duration ratings aligns with our prediction that recollection of
more segments during duration judgments leads to longer ratings, and
is thus consistent with an influence of memory content on prospective
judgments, even when participants are not instructed to remember
content. Surely repeated exposure to the stimuli led participants to
learn something about the animations. But what do they attend to and
encode under the present instructions? One possibility is that when
attending to time, at least some salient event boundaries are important
for the perception of the rhythm or temporal development of the
events, and thus are potentially integral to the perception of duration,
as previously suggested (Boltz, 1992; Jones & Boltz, 1989). The
event boundaries attended to in Experiment 2 are likely to be of a
more coarse size than those in Experiment 1 and our pretest segmen-
tation study. What happens at fine-grained event boundaries (e.g.,
whether a shape changes color/texture, or whether a minor shape
moves) is more relevant to a detailed representation of content (as in
Experiment 1), but these low-level segments might not be attended to
as much in Experiment 2 because fine-grained boundaries are not
considered relevant when encoding information for a duration judg-
ment task. These observations are consistent with many event seg-
mentation studies suggesting that fine-grained segmentation leads to
better recall of specific event characteristics than coarse segmentation,
a consequence of orienting or attending to larger or smaller segments
in the stimulus stream (Hanson & Hirst, 1989; Zacks et al., 2007,
2001).
A difference in orientation to the stimuli in Experiment 1 and 2
(encoding specific stimulus characteristics or not) therefore ex-
plains why we observed relatively poor memory recognition per-
formance and no effect of similarity or grouping conditions in the
durations ratings of Experiment 2, but we did observe an effect of
number of segments in our regressions: only a coarse segmentation
structure was incidentally encoded into memory, possibly as part
of the timing process. Because coarse segments tend to include
fine-grained segments and both are related to salient changes (e.g.,
lower-level segments are embedded into higher-level segments),
coarse and fine-grained segments are typically correlated (Zacks,
Speer, & Reynolds, 2009). Therefore, a correlation between the
number of fine-grained segments and duration judgments would
nevertheless be expected in Experiment 2, as observed in the
regression analyses. We therefore conclude that despite different
attention demands across our studies, the results of rated duration
in Experiment 2 suggest an influence of coarse stimulus segmen-
tation during encoding, which is then recollected and used in
duration judgments.
General Discussion
The findings of Experiment 1 indicated that episodic event struc-
ture, as reflected by the number of event segments and their similarity,
modulated duration ratings in a prospective paradigm when the con-
tent of the interval had been encoded. Moreover, this study showed
that the same fine-grained features of event structure that modulated
duration ratings in a retrospective paradigm also played a role in a
prospective paradigm. This clearly indicates that similar memory
processes are involved in both prospective and retrospective judg-
ments when stimulus content is attended to. The findings of Experi-
ment 2 then revealed that the influence of encoded episodic event
structure on prospective judgments is reduced when attention to
stimulus content is not required, as evidenced by relatively poor
memory performance and no effect of grouping conditions on dura-
tion judgments. Nevertheless, the number of fine-grained segments in
the stimuli—which tend to correlate with larger coarse segments—
accounted for a significant proportion of variance in duration judg-
ments over and above actual clock duration. This result suggests a role
Table 7
Multiple Regression Model for the Duration Ratings of
Experiment 2
Model B SE B '
Model 1
Constant 2.93 .25
Clock duration .21 .04 .52!!!
Model 2
Constant 2.72 .24
Clock duration .10 .05 .23§
Number of sub-events .20 .06 .42!!!
Model 3
Constant 2.73 .40
Clock duration .10 .05 .23§
Number of sub-events .20 .06 .42!!!
Similarity $.001 .06 $.002
!!! p ! .001. § p ! .06 (i.e., marginally significant).
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for segmentation when attending only to duration, despite more su-
perficial stimulus encoding. Therefore, the results overall indicate a
role for encoded event structure in prospective duration judgments.
Because effects of stimulus structure are ultimately linked to the
way in which the stimuli were segmented and encoded during learn-
ing, it can be inferred that episodic memory content modulated the
present prospective judgments. When a memory task was expected
along with duration judgments, participants attended to fine-grain
stimulus properties, including small recognizable units (segments)
and their specific characteristics (changes in shape, color, movement,
etc.). After learning, at the point of the duration judgment, participants
retrieved or automatically activated the animation content and use this
information to provide a duration rating. As in retrospective studies,
the more information is recollected (more segments and more distinc-
tive properties), the longer the judgments. Critically, when only a
(comparative) duration judgment task was expected, the influence of
segmental structure remained. In this case, participants may have
attended to coarse stimulus properties during exposure—those con-
sidered relevant for the duration rating task—and therefore, the en-
coded segmental structure—but not segmental identity—was re-
trieved and used to provide a duration judgment: the more segments
encoded and recalled, the longer the duration ratings. This suggests
that some aspects of the stimulus content, even if coarse, are poten-
tially integral to attending to duration in at least some prospective
paradigms, because the stimulus content provides relevant clues to
judge duration, as suggested by the dynamic attending model (Jones
& Boltz, 1989).
These findings contrast with frequent claims that prospective
judgments are not modulated by encoded information or memory
recollection (Block & Gruber, 2014; Block et al., 2010; Zakay &
Block, 1997), and argue for a more nuanced view of the role of
memory in prospective timing: when available, we employ our
memory of event structure to inform our duration judgments, even
when we have incidentally encoded structure. This is consistent
with previous prospective results using familiar events or seg-
ments, which have shown number-of-segments and predictability
effects (Boltz, 2005; Waldum & Sahakyan, 2013). Importantly, the
present results indicate that in addition to top-down knowledge,
explicitly or incidentally learned event structure modulates dura-
tion judgments.
Task Demands in Prospective Paradigms
In the psychology of time literature, multiple judgment types and
experimental designs have been used (Grondin, 2010). Some exper-
imental designs may be more amenable to the use of memory than
others. For example, the point at which judgments are requested after
stimulus presentation—immediately or after a delay—may bias par-
ticipants to rely on memory recollection (Zakay & Fallach, 1984). In
particular, immediate judgments after each stimulus presentation
surely involve a working memory representation of the stimuli (Gron-
din, 2005; Ogden et al., 2008), whereas delayed judgments—for
example, after a few minutes of stimulus presentation or after the
whole stimulus set has been processed—are likely to engage episodic
memory, because the processed stimuli have to be committed to a
longer-term memory store and cannot be forgotten before the next
stimulus is processed. These observations suggest that the present
prospective task design, as that in Boltz (2005), promoted the use of
memory, and in particular, episodic memory representations that must
be held until later in the experiment (Tulving & Thomson, 1973).
Other experimental protocols have also demonstrated an influence
of episodic memory. Waldum and Sahakyan (2013) for example,
requested prospective duration judgments after stimulus processing.
The experiments presented different songs lasting for longer than 10
min in total while participants performed a secondary task. Such
stimulus length cannot be held in a limited-capacity working memory
(Cowan, 2001), and thus, the stimuli need to be committed to episodic
memory in chunks or segments, as described in memory updating
models (Radvansky & Copeland, 2006; Swallow, Zacks, & Abrams,
2009). As a result, participants provided judgments that correlated
with the number of songs recalled. These results suggest a role of
episodic memory in prospective judgments when the familiar nature
and the long duration of the stimuli promote the use of encoded
segmental structure to provide duration judgments.
Some experimental protocols surely need not rely on episodic
memory, but most of them require stimulus encoding in some
form, for example, in working memory, and therefore stimulus
segmentation/chunking is an important factor to consider. Working
memory experiments using seconds-long stimuli and duration
judgments after each stimulus presentation have already high-
lighted the role of segmental structure. For example, many studies
have shown that the number of sensory stimuli (segments) pre-
sented correlates positively with the judged duration (Buffardi,
1971; Poynter & Homa, 1983). Effects of stimulus predictability,
which sometimes lead to opposite correlations with the number of
segments, may depend on encoding difficulty and/or the segmen-
tation strategies adopted. It is possible for example that stimuli that
are easier to structure are judged shorter than stimuli that are
harder to segment because of violations of prior expectations
(Block et al., 2010; Liverence & Scholl, 2012; Meyerhoff et al.,
2015; Schiffman & Bobko, 1974; Zakay et al., 1994). Differences
in the role of event structure in prospective duration judgments
may therefore stem from the structural analyses performed during
encoding and its relation to prior knowledge, indicating a role for
semantic memory and prior knowledge rarely considered in the
literature.
These suggestions remain speculative and are unlikely to ac-
count for every single past or future finding. Surely, there could be
tasks in which participants ignore stimulus content altogether and
engage in other strategies like silently counting. Ultimately, the
way in which participants approach the stimuli will depend on the
type of information that they deem relevant given the instructions
that they received before hand. Nevertheless, it appears that more
nuanced distinctions need to be considered when discussing pro-
spective paradigms: namely, whether they involve limited-capacity
working memory for immediate judgment or episodic representa-
tions for later judgments, and in both cases, whether representa-
tions are formed through top-down expectations or bottom-up
analysis, intentionally or incidentally.
Conclusion
The present findings suggest that newly formed episodic event
memories play a role in prospective judgments: if participants have
formed a memory of the events to be judged, they employ this
representation to inform their judgments, even when they have also
attended to duration. Specifically, fine-grained characteristics of
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the encoded event structure such as the number of segments and
their similarity play a role in a prospective paradigm, just as they
do in a retrospective paradigm. Moreover, even when participants
have only attended to duration and did not explicitly encode
content, they use some form of segmentation during stimulus
processing that impacts on duration judgments. Previous prospec-
tive studies using a variety of protocols also indicate a role for
encoded segmental structure, although this structure is likely in-
fluenced by prior expectations. Therefore, it appears that event
structure, whether explicitly or incidentally encoded, is accessed
and used in many prospective protocols.
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